Safety as a Culture

'Safety as a Culture'

Safety must become accepted as a 'culture' if we are to reduce fire fighter deaths and injuries, a 'culture' that is jointly owned by everyone at every rank and in every position within the profession of the fire and rescue service. Safety cannot be something that is solely the responsibility of management in general or the Incident Commander in particular at the scene of an emergency situation.

The safety 'culture' must be taught from day one of employment and continue, with regular re-education, through to the first day of retirement from the profession. It must be regarded as being the absolute number one consideration in all aspects of a fire fighters life, which includes day to day activities when not attending emergency incidents.

In the United Kingdom, the first serious consideration to be given to introducing incident command safety date back to World War II when structured accountability systems were introduced to cater for the large numbers of fire fighters, who may have originated from hundreds of miles away, attending the many cities on fire due to enemy air raids. These control systems, albeit simple and possibly even crude by today's thinking, did provide for some basic incident command and incident accountability measures.

In 1943 as the introduction of more reliable breathing apparatus started to emerge, it was recognized that fire fighters were becoming more vulnerable as they were then able to penetrate further into smoke-filled buildings. The guidance issued in the Nationally adopted "Manual of Firemanship" stated that:

· BA wearers should always work in pairs
· That on occasions it may be desirable to trial rope to enable them to retrace their steps
· In some circumstances it may be advantageous to provide a second rope to be used for signals

In 1956 the first BA Entry Control Boards were introduced and in the same year was further refined with the introduction of entry tallies for each BA wearer.

This procedure, with updates and refinements continues, to this day, to be an automatic and fundamental procedure put into operation at each and every incident when BA is worn - even if the wearers are in the open and can be seen. Personal Lines and Guide Lines were introduced in 1969 after a previous period of extensive trials. Distress Signal Units (DSUS) on every BA sets (the forerunner of today's automatic DSUS) (PASS alarms) were specified in 1966.

A standard evacuation signal using whistles was introduced in 1969 and is still in use today.

I have been a member of the fire and rescue service since August 1968 and since my first day I have been fortunate in being able to attend emergency incidents knowing, firstly that there will be a record that can be checked to establish that I am in attendance at the incident and, that if I have been instructed to enter a smoke-filled building in BA, there will be a control point outside with someone who knows that I went into the building, the time of entry, the pressure in my cylinder at that time, the time that I was due out based on calculations against that entry pressure and an indication of where I was sent to work. Additionally, I as a BA wearer had been extensively trained to understand and appreciate standard operating procedures for working in BA, how to lay and use guide lines, to regularly check my gauge and anticipate when I should be returning to the entry point and what to do in the event of entrapment or other emergency.

I have also always had the security of knowing that if I became a victim of an emergency situation, an emergency crew ready rigged in BA, who could not be used for any other purpose could be immediately sent in to find me on the instruction of the entry control operator who would most likely be of fire fighter rank and who was empowered to act without referral to a higher rank. It is also a fact that at incidents where crews had come across the border with an adjoining fire and rescue service, those crew members would be working to those some accountability and control systems.

I believe it to be factually correct to say that following the full adoption of these BA entry control procedures there have only been 2 fire fighter deaths since 1966 attributed to disorientation and exhausting of air supply.

What I am trying to say is, that I have, for over 32 years of operational duties in my profession, been part of and grown up with a safety 'culture'. In the beginning I responded to it and was instructed in correct adoption of the procedures and now in my senior management and incident command position I not only adopt these procedures for myself, I also am responsible for adding to and improving the 'culture'.

In the UK today the 'culture' is referred to as "The Safe Person Concept". This concept has two aspects which are jointly owned responsibilities:

· The Organizational Responsibility - which must provide the support necessary to ensure that all personnel are able to remain safe in a hostile environment; and
· The Personal Responsibility - which allows the individual to make professional judgments about the appropriate use of available resources, in order to control the risks inherent in the unique circumstances of any emergency situation. In short everyone has a role to play in maintaining a safety 'culture' and in taking all reasonable steps to provide a safe working environment.

How then do we achieve this concept - this 'culture'? Apart from an acceptance of the relevant levels of responsibility by each and every person in the Organization, and of course not forgetting the learning process gained by experience, it is training and education and re-training and re-education that is at the heart of the solution to the problem.

Safety has to be sold to all new recruits from the day that they start. They must be taught about the design features of their personal protective equipment (turnout gear and BA in particular), they must learn the importance of maintenance of this equipment to the highest level of care and they must be able to recognize when it is not suitable for further use.

Learning to work as an integral part of a team is vital and knowing how to operate within an incident command system must be high on the curriculum of any course. Even during a recruits course all fire fighters should take part in. drills and evolutions that result in every recruit on the course being placed in a position of crew command. Knowing the impact of decisions made by an individual is very important in personal and career development.

On leaving a recruits course each fire fighter ought to be going to his or her station of posting, already taking on the first Personal Responsibility aspects of a safety 'culture'. On arrival at that station of posting, that recruit ought to be secure in the knowledge that he or she is joining a team of more experience fire fighters at a later stage of the acceptance of the Personal Responsibility with a[[ working in an environment set firmly by those with Organizational Responsibility.

Any continuation training should re-emphasize safety needs and the necessity for risk assessment. Those aspiring to later positions as officers should receive more in-depth training in operational command, which should include risk assessment. This training should be aimed at preparing the individual to move from the Personal Responsibility mode to that of Organizational Responsibility. More importantly, for those, who as fire fighters may act as a crew commander (Company Officer) from time to time and for those who have already attained an officer rank, there should be monitoring and measuring of command competencies. Measuring can range from simple feedback from senior officers, formal debrief post-incident or use of command training methods including simulators. Post-incident debriefs are an excellent method, whereby all, or at least a cross section of representatives from crews and officers can feedback either in written form or at face to face debriefs. Such debriefs are obviously not necessary or even achievable for all incidents, but equally there is much to be learned from the smaller incidents as well as those of a larger nature.

There should be a clear organizational policy which gives options for debriefs and post-incident analysis and officers of all ranks should be trained to recognize when a debrief would be beneficial.

Crew Commanders (Company Officers) can find out a great deal about their own ability and that of a crew by holding such debriefs for even the smallest and mundane of incidents.

In providing the correct environment to allow a safety 'culture' to exist, it makes good sense for that 'culture' to be part of all aspects of daily life at work. Although admittedly cursed at times, in the UK we have a very strong "Health and Safety at Work Act", much of which is mandatory with responsibilities being placed on the management of all employing organizations. Each individual also has a 'duty of self-care'. With this powerful legislation the 'culture' can be extended into all aspects of a fire fighters job.

Our experience in the UK includes Health and Safety representatives at every place at work, which of course includes each and every fire station. The representative wilt be one of the members of the station, of any rank who has volunteered to take on this role and who receives some higher level training. Regular inspections of the workplace take place to identify any hazards and these representatives can also be involved in any training evolutions planned which may be of a nature outside those for which generic risk assessments have been formulated. The organization as a whole has a Health and Safety Committee, with a cross section of representation of all ranks and roles and a balance between management and other employees.

All of the above sets the 'culture' and each and every member of the service is welcomed into this way of life from day one of employment and, today those who have gained employment in recent years know no different.

Adopting a safety 'culture' by those who have not grown up within one, will require a change of mind-set and a great deal of hard work by all concerned but particularly by the management of the organization, the officers who have the responsibility for others wrapped up in their command decisions - and also in their commitment to developing a 'culture' through training, enforcement of policies, persuasion of the skeptical and of course the imparting of experience.

There have been great improvements to the design of firefighting clothing and breathing apparatus during the past decade and many fire and rescue services have adopted these advances to increase the safety of their fire fighters. Curiously it is these same improvements that have presented another hazard the knife-edge between protection and over protection.

The danger of our fire fighters being able to penetrate into a burning building too far, too soon can result in them being in hazardous situations before the necessary support and command systems are in place. If for no other reason, officers making decisions have to become more aware of the need for risk assessment and of the necessity for structured and appropriate incident command measures.

Fire fighters often enjoy the nametag 'hero' or according to some, even 'superhero' and in my experience, nowhere in the world is this written up in the same fashion as it is in the US. Does this create a death cultured A do or die mentality Are Senior Chief Officers allowing this to perpetuate? That safety is not a macho thing? That training to die is more accepted than training to live?

If new fire fighter recruits in the US believe the various aggressive T Shirts, Company Patches, 'battle honor' slogans and the increasing number of hero immortality decals and artwork displayed on fire engines, then the mind-set may never be changed and fire fighter deaths and injuries will continue be the highest in the world. Contrary to what these symbols of belonging and statements of myth may portray, fire fighters are not flapproof, (simply because of this chosen career name), they cannot survive in smoke when other lesser mortals die, they cannot find a magic supply of air when their BA tank is empty and when they die, they stay dead like anyone else!

Sadly, we in our profession are unlikely to see a time when all fire fighter deaths are eradicated, but there are many steps that can be taken to reduce them. The Chief of every Fire and Rescue Service in the world has the responsibility and the duty to continually review the safety of all personnel under his or her command and should ensure that others adopt and implement all policies and good practices.

Safety is a corporate responsibility. Think Safe, Plan Safe, Be Safe.